

## HUMAN DECISIONS (II)

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9. From all this it becomes very clear that it is not possible to give a really sensible answer to “why-questions”:

9.1 Either what happened, what is done came out of a decision in freedom, how little eventually the freedom was conscious, so there is no reason in the cause-and-effect sense at all,

9.2 or, what happened was (only or mostly) a result of mimetic processes, the person to whom the why-question is put just being an object in the midst of all these mimetic influences. In fact when we are object in mimetic processes we nearly never know it and even when we know, we never really understand, why we are feeling, experiencing like this, doing like that, because the whole is much too complicated to understand. And if we dimly know, then nevertheless we don't know. Exactly then we know that there is more to say about it than we know and that we cannot find it. We say: We are brought to it. That we are the victim of fate, of the gods..

So all answers on why-questions always are rationalisations, found for the situation in which the why-question is put. They might be in the neighbourhood of being in accordance with what really happened, when it is about simple and (easily) understandable deeds and decisions, if the question is put in a situation which is not threatening. But even then it never is truth. Truth is always and only given. It never can be acquired by asking.

Hengelo, 9.11.90

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